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I.

INTRODUCTION

Supporters of the proposed Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act' have not produced satisfactory answers to two fundamental questions. First, why does
the region require significant new incentives for the construction
of nuclear and coal-fired power plants? Second, why must Congress link urgently needed encouragement of conservation and
renewable energy measures to the creation of such incentives?
On the most crucial issue, from an environmental perspective, there appears to be general agreement among the bill's
sponsors in both chambers of Congress: the Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA) should acquire express statutory authority to underwrite the development of thermal power plants by
contracting in advance to purchase their capability. The BPA
commitments would take the form of a guarantee to plant sponsors that BPA would pay for a facility's entire rated output of
energy throughout its projected life, even if that facility never
produced a single kilowatt-hour of electricity.2 If the recipient of
such a pledge were an investor-owned utility, it could put aside
* Project Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council. The views expressed in this
article are not necessarily those of the Council. Mr. Cavanagh gratefully acknowledges
insights provided by Roger Beers of NRDC and Jim Blomquist of the Sierra Club.
1. This article addresses the version of the proposed Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act that reached the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives in September, 1980. See H.R. 8157, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 8157]. The Senate approved a different text in 1979. See S. 885, 96th
Cong., 1st Ses., S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as S.

885].
2. See H.R. 8157, supra note 1, § 3(19)(A). This section would authorize the BPA
Administrator to acquire "electric power, including the actual or planned electric power
capability of generating facilities." The Senate Report on S. 885 specifies that "the
phrase 'actual or planned capability' is meant to include the planned output of a gener... S. Rap.
ating facility, Whether or not operating or operable in whole or in part.
No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1979).
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otherwise justified fears that its state regulatory commission
might compel the utility's stockholders to absorb the staggering
costs of an unproductive thermal energy gamble. Similarly, if
the recipient of the guarantee were a publicly owned utility, it
could count on the entire region's ratepayers to assume the risk
of losses that otherwise would fall on its own short-tempered
electorate. This "guaranteed purchase authority" is only one of
several beneficent gestures to the thermal power industry that
emerge from a close reading of Senator Jackson's "Conservation
Act." No purpose essential to the professed aims of the bill is
served by these anomalous provisions.

II.

THE DUBIOUS CASE FOR GUARANTEED PURCHASE AUTHORITY

The Congressional findings set out in the bill' are unimpeachable. Recent developments have demonstrated the need
"to encourage . . . efficiency in the use of electric power, . . .
and the development of renewable resources within the Pacific
Northwest ' 4 through a regional planning process involving
extensive public participation. BPA, which dominates a field of
relatively small private and consumer-owned utilities, is an obvious candidate for administering conservation programs and
spurring development of renewable energy resources. In principle, many of the mechanisms the bill would establish are
unobjectionable: a Regional Council-with representatives from
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington-charged with preparing and implementing a regional electric power plan, which
gives top priority to conservation and renewable energy
resources; public hearings prior to adoption of the plan and at
periodic intervals thereafter; rate adjustments reflecting utilities'
conservation records; technical and financial assistance for conservation programs undertaken by BPA's customers; and demonstration projects to determine the feasibility of various conservation measures and renewable resource applications.3 The last
thing one would expect to see appended to such a list is a
scheme for expediting construction of conventional thermal
power plants. Yet that is precisely what emerges, in the guise of
a "last resort" accompanied by the almost apologetic explanation that its omission would preclude BPA from executing the
3. See H.R. 8157, supra note 1, § 2.
4. Id. § 2(1).

5. Id. §§ 4-6.
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region-wide requirements contracts which figure so largely in the
bill's design.' That assertion is simply false.
At least four recent studies have concluded that no thermal
power plants, other than those already under construction, will
be needed to serve the Pacific Northwest through at least 1995,
if currently feasible and cost-effective conservation strategies
and renewable resource applications are pursued.7 Thus, there is
a threshold doubt that BPA would need to purchase the output
of any new plants in order to sign the requirements contracts
contemplated in the bill. As a result, the General Accounting
Office has counseled strongly against "firm [BPA] commitments
in the near future to help finance conventional thermal power
plants in the Pacific Northwest."8
Even assuming all those studies are wrong, and utility projections showing a need for new thermal capacity are credible,
nothing in current law or practice prevents those utilities from
putting construction dollars behind their dour forecasts; the
region already has sixteen coal and nuclear plants in operation
or under development.' An argument can be made for authorizing BPA to purchase the output of plants which have been completed and certified operational, if that proves necessary to fulfill the new BPA contractual obligations contemplated in the
bill. What defies understanding is that Congress seems bent on
going much further, by brushing aside the cautionary influence
of existing market and regulatory forces and inviting prospective
plant sponsors to ignore the lessons of recent cost overruns,
delays, and unplanned shutdowns.
6. See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning: Hearings on H.R. 3508
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 130-31 (1979) (statement of BPA Administrator
Sterling Munro).
7. Energy Research and Development Administration, Choosing an Electrical
Energy Future for the Pacific Northwest: An Alternative Scenario (Jan. 31, 1977); Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Bonneville Power Administration Electric Energy Conservation
Study (July 1976); TRW, Energy Systems Planning Division, Evaluation of Electrical
Power Alternatives for the Pacific Northwest (Sept. 1977); U.S. General Accounting
Office, Report to the Congress, Region at the Crossroads-The Pacific Northwest
Searches for New Sources of Electric Energy (Aug. 19, 1978).
8. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 7, at viii. A subsequent GAO report
concuded that "at this time, Bonneville is not adequately prepared to construct or oversee the construction of large generating facilities." U.S. General Accounting Office,
Impacts and Implications of the Pacific Northwest Power Bill iii (Sept. 4, 1979).
9. A review of Northwest energy supply options did not convince the General
Accounting Office that regional utilities needed federal assistance to obtain the capital
needed for new generating plants. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 7, at 7.2.
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III. How A LAST RESORT CAN TAKE Top PRIORITY

The low priority expressly assigned to thermal power
plants 0 appears to circumscribe the likelihood that the bill
would stimulate unnecessary construction. If a combination of
cost-effective conservation measures and renewable resources
could meet the region's needs, BPA would not promote thermal
development;" if not, surely new power plants are preferable to
blackouts and chaos. However plausible that statement might
seem as an abstract proposition, it does not justify the bill's
treatment of purchase authority. Decisions about power plant
construction must be made on the basis of projections, not contemporaneous facts. The extraordinarily long leadtimes associated with any nuclear or coal-fired facility necessarily mean that
BPA purchase authority could not eliminate an imminent supply shortfall, or even one anticipated a decade hence. 2 The decision whether to acquire plant capability would hinge on necessarily speculative projections of demand levels toward the end of
the twenty-year period covered in the proposed regional power
plan.
Under such circumstances, it is important to consider the
institutional predispositions of the agency designated to make
the projections. Senator Jackson has tellingly observed that
"[t]he more I've looked at forecasting, whether it's weather,
energy, or economics forecasting, the more I've become convinced that more often than not it's Russian roulette."'" BPA
may soon have an unparalleled opportunity to validate Senator
Jackson's metaphor; the bill invites the Regional Council to
delegate its planning and forecasting responsibilities to BPA
4

personnel.1

10. "The plan shall ... give priority to resources which the Council determines to
be cost-effective. Priority shall be given: first, to conservation; second, to renewable
resources; third, to generating resources utilizing waste heat or generating resources of
high fuel conversion efficiency; and fourth, to all other resources." H.R. 8157, supra note
1, § 4(e)(1).
11. See id. §§ 4(e), 6.
12. The Bonneville Power Administration concedes as much. Administrator Sterling
Munro admitted in recent testimony that "lilt is too late now to start a new coal-fired or
nuclear power project-if that's what people decide they want-to help during the '80's
....
" Testimony of Sterling Munro, before a joint meeting of the House and Senate
Energy Committees of the Washington State Legislature 4 (Jan. 17, 1980) (memo on file
with the Senate Energy and Utilities Committee, Olympia, Wash.).
13. The Daily World (Aberdeen, Wash.), Dec. 15, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1.
14. The Council is instructed, when determining its staff needs, to take "into
account such information and analyses as are, or are likely to be, available from other
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Citizens need not look far for evidence of the kind of planning that is likely to emerge from a Council induced to rely primarily on BPA expertise. In 1976, BPA and its client utilities
prepared a long-range forecast of area loads and resources that
covered the time period contemplated in the bill. The forecast
estimated that 1995-1996 demand would be more than two and
one-half times the 1975 level, and called for construction of
some twenty-six new large-scale nuclear or coal-fired power
plants.15 To put that figure in perspective, the sponsors of five
Washington nuclear plants currently foresee a final construction
bill of $17.3 billion, pending the next round of unforeseen cost
overruns.16 By 1980, utility projections of demand growth had
dropped somewhat, but they still showed a deficit of almost
5,500 average megawatts for the region (the output of eight to
nine large thermal plants) during the 1995-1996 operating year,
even if all eleven nuclear and coal-fired units now planned or
under construction were then in operation.17 Moreover, BPA
Administrator Sterling Munro recently stated that the projections at issue "may be too low."" At least four independent
studies vigorously contest these forecasts, concluding that the
utilities' calculations pervasively fail to take the potential contribution of conservation and renewable resources into account.'
However, it is the Bonneville Power Administration, not the
authors of those independent studies, which is most likely to
sources pursuant to provisions of this Act." H.R. 8157, supra note 1, § 4(a)(3). In addition, "[ulpon request of the Council ... the head of any Federal agency is authorized to
detail or assign to the Council . . . any of the personnel of such agency to assist the
Council in the performance of its functions under this Act." Id. § 4(c)(5). The Senate
report is still more candid: "[I]t
is intended that the [BPA] Administrator fully utilize
his expertise and staff to assist the Council in [formulating the plan] and in any subsequent effort to amend the plan." S. REP. No. 272, supra note 2, at 23-24.

15. PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, LONG-RANGE PROJECTION OF POWER LOADS AND RESOURCES FOR THERMAL PLANNING WEST GROUP AREA, 197677 THROUGH 1995-96, Table 1 (1976).
16. The sponsor in question is the Washington Public Power Supply System, a
consortium of consumer-owned utilities. The $17.3 billion figure constitutes a 47%
increase over 1978 projections and exceeds the original estimates by a factor of four.
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 2, 1980, § B, at 2, col. 1; Seattle Times, Nov. 22, 1980,
§ A, at 1, col..
17. PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, LONG RANGE PROJECTION
OF POWER LOADS AND RESOURCES FOR RESOURCE PLANNING, WEST GROUP AREA (1980-81
THROUGH 1999-2000), Table 1 (1979).
18. S. Munro, Our Cloudy Crystal Ball 4 (Jan. 18, 1980) (remarks before the Seattle
Federal Executive Board) (copy on file at Bonneville Power Administration, Portland,
Or.).
19. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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emerge as the Regional Council's primary technical assistant. If
the agency persists in its traditional skepticism about the total
contribution such measures can make, while simultaneously
retaining an inflated view of the Northwest's future energy
needs, the result will be a regional plan relying primarily on the
bill's "least favored" alternative: thermal power plants. The
problem lies not so much in the speculative nature of the projections involved, but in the demonstrable likelihood that BPA has
already predetermined the key issues adversely to the goals enumerated by the bill's draftsmen. In the world as BPA sees it,
even if cost-effective conservation and renewable resources are
given highest priority, the region ends up with little of either.
BPA Administrator Sterling Munro has repeatedly stated
that the least expensive electric power generation options currently available to the Northwest, "except for some forms of
conservation and some existing opportunities for cogeneration,"
are large-scale nuclear facilities.20 That attitude is incompatible
with the bill's goal of promoting renewable resources. Munro's
views on conservation are also a matter of record: he sees maximum possible BPA effort under the bill producing potential savings of 500 to 1,000 megawatts ("one-half to one big thermal
power plant"). 1 If the Council accepts both that conclusion and
the high demand growth projections of the region's utilities, the
unavoidable prospect is a surge of unnecessary new thermal
power plant construction.

IV.

THE ANATOMY OF GUARANTEED PURCHASE AUTHORITY:
FURTHER GROUNDS FOR CONCERN

Even if the Regional Council produced a plan that did not
expressly license BPA to acquire the capability of thermal
resources not already in existence, a BPA Administrator bent on
such a course might be difficult to restrain. The Senate version
of the bill offered the loophole of a regional plan intentionally
vague in its mandate and prohibitions;" the House sensibly
20. See, e.g., Munro, Twenty Questions 4 (Jan. 24, 1980) (remarks before the Electric Club of Oregon, Portland, Oregon) (copy on file at Bonneville Power Administration,
Portland, Or.).
21. Testimony of Sterling Munro, supra note 12, at 7.
22. "It is intended that the plan will not be a highly detailed operational document
but instead will be a broad policy document which addresses major issues involved in
planning and development of resources including conservation." S. REP. No. 272, supra
note 2, at 24.
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inserted a requirement that the plan specify "the approximate
amounts of power the Council recommends should be acquired
by the Administrator on a long-term basis and. . . the types of
resources from which such power should be acquired." 2 3 However, the Administrator can disregard the Council's recommendation if he finds that a different course "is needed to meet [his]
obligations under this Act."2 ' Put another way, if BPA forecasts
clash with those of the Council, BPA will prevail-provided, to
be sure, that Congress expressly concurs in a federal statute
"enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act." 5 Little
comfort can be gleaned from the insertion of that procedural
prerequisite, when what it accompanies is a vehicle for nullifying
the very regional planning mechanism that supposedly constitutes the bill's primary justification.
The foregoing discussion hardly exhausts the bill's generosity in matters thermal. For example, on no basis more substantial than a preliminary finding of probable justification,' 6 the
BPA Administrator could sign a truly remarkable contract with
the prospective sponsor of a conventional power plant. That
contract would guarantee the sponsor full reimbursement, from
the pockets of all Pacific Northwest ratepayers, for his "investigation and preconstruction expenses," excluding procurement of
capital equipment or construction materials, should a state or
federal authority subsequently refuse to grant necessary permits,
thereby aborting the project.2 7 Once the regional plan is promulgated, its provisions may limit or preclude the use of this prerogative; in the interim, however, the Administrator will be relying
on his own assessments of the need for, and cost-effectiveness of,
proposed coal-fired and nuclear plants.2 8
The bill's treatment of preconstruction expenses affords an
obvious means for undermining the planning priorities enumerated elsewhere in the legislation. The same observation applies
to another provision that commendably allows the Administrator to award billing credits for utility-instigated conservation
measures or renewable resource applications, 9 only to vitiate the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

H.R. 8157, supra note 1, § 4(e)(3)(D).
Id. § 6(c)(1)(D)(i).
Id. § 6(c)(3)(B).
See id. §§ 6(c)(1)(D), 6(f)(1).
Id. § 6(f).
See id. § 6(f)(1).
See id. § 6(h).

34

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 4:27

gesture by rendering thermal power plants eligible for the same
treatment.3 0 Indeed, the Administrator apparently must grant
rate relief for construction of conventional facilities "[i]f a customer so requests" and the resource is "not inconsistent with the
plan." s ' The distinction-if any-between "not inconsistent"
and "consistent" will probably have to be resolved by the judicial branch.
Given their lack of experience with alternatives, utilities
have an understandable, albeit unfortunate, tendency to look to
new conventional plants first when confronting the possibility of
increased demand. The prospect of billing credits affords them
an additional incentive to go on indulging this preference. Moreover, by rendering plants under construction prior to the bill's
effective date eligible for such benefits, 3 this provision may give
investors a windfall that they had no reason or right to expect
when they launched their enterprises. Of course, BPA would
only be authorized to grant credits in an amount equivalent to
the savings realized by the region,33 but that calculation will be
made in the murky realm of BPA-dominated planning and prediction. As noted earlier, the incumbent BPA Administrator
takes a uniquely sanguine view of the "cost-effectiveness" of
nuclear facilities now under construction in the Northwest.

V.

TAMING THE REGIONAL POWER BILL

While the warnings of the preceding sections are amply
grounded, enactment of regional power legislation need not lead
inexorably to a rash of ground-breakings for new coal and
nuclear power plants. The bill does not preclude the emergence
of an adequately staffed, independent Regional Council, which
will decline to serve as a proxy for the Bonneville Power Administration. Should that occur, the prospects for regional planning
and BPA investment are not wholly negative from an environmental perspective.
30. See id. § 6(h)(1)(B).
31. Id. § 6(h)(1) contra, 126 CONG. REc. S. 14,699 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980) (remarks
of Sen. McClure).
32. Id. § 6(h)(1)(A).
33. "The rate impact to the Administrator's other customers of granting the credit
shall be no greater than the rate impact such customers would have exerienced had the
Administrator been obligated to acquire resources in an amount equal to that actually
produced by the resource for which the credit is granted." Id. § 6(h)(4). See S. REP. No.
272, supra note 2, at 30-31.
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In September, 1980, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) released a comprehensive analysis of the Northwest's
energy options that is functionally indistinguishable from the
regional plan contemplated in the bill.' That study produced
specific projections of the regional potential for cost-effective
conservation, renewable resource applications, and generating
resources utililizing waste heat.3 5 The NRDC scenario identified
readily achievable increases in the efficiency with which electricity is used in the residential, commercial, agricultural, and
industrial sectors.6 In addition, the study anticipated modest
contributions, by 1995, from several new energy supply sources,
34. R.

CAVANAGH,

L. Mor, R. BEERs & T.

LASH, CHOOSING AN ELECTRICAL ENERGY

(1980) [hereinafter cited
as ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO]. The study, which expands and updates an earlier NRDC
assessment of the region's conservation potential, was prepared under contract to the
U.S. Department of Energy.
35. See id.
36. Some of the study's key assumptions include:
A. Manufacturing Sector- By 1995, industries throughout the region will install
cogeneration facilities at sites identified in a recent BPA survey. The aluminum industry,
which consumes more than one-fifth of the Northwest's electricity, will cut 1975 energy
requirements per pound of output 20% by 1985 and 40% by 1995 (four major Northwest
plants have already met the 1985 target). Other industries will reduce 1975 requirements
per unit of output 10-17% by 1985 and 18-19% by 1995, in line with recent projections
by the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. Id. at 76-100.
B. CommercialSector. As mercury vapor street lights wear out, they will be replaced
with more efficient high pressure sodium units. Existing buildings (circa 1976) still in use
in 1995 will adopt highly cost-effective energy efficiency improvements identified in a
1976 study commissioned by the Bonneville Power Administration. These include lowering lighting levels outside work areas, reducing water heating temperatures, and reducing
energy waste in ventilation systems. New buildings will comply with construction standards already in force throughout most of the Northwest. Id. at 61-75.
C. Residential Sector.Over the next fifteen years, insulation will be installed in the
ceilings, walls and floors of 90% of existing (circa 1976) single-family dwellings, and in
85% of multiple-family units. Comparable percentages of existing homes will install
storm windows and weather-stripping, and will set thermostats at an average of 62
degrees Farenheit at night. Financing mechanisms for spreading the costs of the installation measures are described in detail. New homes will be constructed to meet efficiency
standards that are actually somewhat less stringent than those established in draft
nationwide Building Energy Performance Standards (BEPS) recently released by the
U.S. Department of Energy. By 1995, 20% of single-family homes will incorporate passive solar design features (e.g., south-facing windows, installation of stone, brick or water
heat-storage masses); heat pumps will provide space heating in 25% of single-family
homes and seven per cent of multiple-family units; 20% of single-family homes will have
heat pump water heaters, and 8% will have solar water heaters. Id. at 34-60.
D. Agricultural Sector. Efficiency improvements in irrigation pumps, plus modest
contributions from small wind machines and photovoltaic cells, will displace 10% of the
conventionally generated electric energy that would otherwise be needed for irrigation in
1995. Id. at 101-10.
FUTURE FOR THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
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including waste heat from industrial sources (cogeneration) and
wind.
The NRDC analysis incorporates a number of conservatisms, to preclude overstatement of opportunities for demand
reductions. 8 The scenario emphatically does not describe a "no
growth" society; NRDC's calculations are based on BPA's bullish economic and population growth projections for the region.39
In a preliminary review of the scenario's recommendations,
a BPA task force conceded: "[T]he [NRDC] scenario does
include an array of conservation and renewable resources that
are cost effective when compared against the costs of new electricity generation. As such, full implementation of those measures would result in lower costs to the Northwest."40 "Full
implementation of those measures" would also bring the Northwest through 1995 at least with a comfortable electricity supply
surplus, even if only three of the seven coal and nuclear units
now under construction were completed.4 1 The scenario outlines

37. Id. at 83-84, 96-99 (cogeneration); 112-17 (wind energy).
38. For example, the scenario does not impose major demands on renewable energy
technologies. Total wind-generated electricity by 1995 is assumed to equal less than 75%
of the potential identified in Oregon alone by the Governor's Wind Task Force. Id. at
114. No wood-fired power plants or other biomass converters (e.g., wood stoves) are
assumed. Photovoltaics are restricted to limited agricultural applications. Id. at 102-04.
Hydropower availability under the scenario reflects only the "worst-case" drought year
estimates used by the Bonneville Power Administration for planning purposes.
In addition, the scenario anticipates continued heavy reliance on electric energy to
meet space heating needs of residential and commercial buildings. For example, the
scenario assumes that 95% of the homes built between 1975 and 1995 will be electrically
heated. Id. at 39. The NRDC calculations also accommodate the possible, but unlikely,
construction of a new energy-intensive aluminum plant at Umatilla, Oregon. Id. at 82.
39. Id. at 19-20. BPA's population projections significantly exceed those of the U.S.
Census Bureau. Id.
40. Bonneville Power Administration, Evaluation of the Natural Resources Defense
Council's 'Alternative Scenario' 12 (Aug. 27, 1980) (on file at Natural Resources Defense
Council, 25 Kearny St., San Francisco, Cal. 94108). The cost-effectiveness of the measures recommended by NRDC has been confirmed in other studies as well. See, e.g.,
TRW, supra note 7, at 1-7, 1-8; U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 7, at 6.12-.14.
41. See ALTERNATIWE SCENAmo, supra note 34, at 26-27. Phased adoption of the scenario's recommendations would result in electrical energy surpluses for the region in
1985 and 1995, even if the following coal and nuclear units were deferred:
Under construction: Washington Public Power Supply System Units 4 & 5 (nuclear/
Washington); Coalstrip Units 3 & 4 (coal/Montana).
Planned: Skagit Units 1 & 2 (nuclear/Washington); Pebble Springs Units 1 & 2
(nuclear/Oregon); plus the equivalent of at least seven nuclear units comparable in size
to these planned facilities, which would be needed to eliminate the 1995 deficit that the

region's utilities currently anticipate. Cf. PACIFIC

NORTHWEST UTLrrlES CONFERENCE

COMWTrEE, supra note 17, Table 1, (showing energy deficit of 5438 average megawatts in
1995-96 water year, assuming adverse river flows).

19801

Pacific Northwest Power Act

a detailed agenda for all major institutions that play a role in
shaping the region's energy future: state and local governments,
investor-/ and consumer-owned utilities, and BPA. Recommended measures include revised rate structures, rehabilitation
programs for residential and commercial buildings, appliance
efficiency standards, conservation-oriented building codes, efficiency-related restrictions on utilities' access to cheap BPA
energy, and financing mechanisms designed to minimize the burden of the new programs on individual homeowners and businesses. 42 None of these proposals can be dismissed as visionary;
all have a firm basis in existing precedents. 4 8 Equally important,
all are clearly within the regional power bill's contemplation as
"model conservation standards," which must form an integral
part of the regional plan."
The clear import of the NRDC scenario is that no new thermal power plants would find their way into a regional plan that
first exhausted all feasible and cost-effective conservation,
renewable energy, and cogeneration measures. Thus, if the
NRDC analysis is substantially correct, the Regional Council
could not authorize any BPA guarantees of new coal or nuclear
capacity without unlawfully disregarding the availability of costeffective alternatives.
Moreover, the Council could not blind itself to the self-evident irrelevance of multi-billion dollar structures with twelve-I
to fourteen-year lead times to the electrical energy needs of the
next decade. Pressures to authorize the underwriting of such
enterprises will be countered, to some extent, by the necessity of
finding responses to increasing threats of curtailment during the
42. See ALTERNATIVE SCENAIO, supra note 34, at 169-250.
43. For example, utilities throughout the region are or soon will be investing in residential conservation measures, id. at 182-86; all four Northwest states have adopted conservation-oriented building codes, id. at 188-91; appliance efficiency requirements will
soon be in force nationwide, 42 U.S.C. § 6295(c) (1976); 45 Fed. Reg. 43976, 44033-45
(1980); the President has imposed temperature controls for commercial buildings in the
Northwest and elsewhere, pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6261, 6262 (1976); the Bonneville Power Administration has issued proposed
conservation requirements to guide allocation of its electricity supplies, 45 Fed. Reg.
58938-45 (1980).
standards applicable to
44. "Model conservation standards . . . shall include ...
(A) new and existing structures, (B) utility, customer and governmental conservation
programs, and (C) other consumer actions . . . designed to produce all power savings
that are cost-effective for the region and economically feasible for consumers, taking into
"H.R. 8157, supra note 2,
account financial assistance made available to consumers ..

§ 4(f)(1).
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1980's. 46 As the preceding sections attest, the impetus for new
thermal development under the bill is strong enough to ensure a
sharp struggle over the framing and implementation of the
regional power plan. Nevertheless, the release of the NRDC scenario buttresses the conclusion that vigilant and informed public
participation can help prevent the transformation of a "planning
and conservation" statute into a bill for the relief of thermal
power plant sponsors.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is every reason to encourage cost-effective conservation and development of renewable energy resources in the
Pacific Northwest. There is no reason whatever to undermine
that effort by creating additional encouragement for costly and
environmentally destructive facilities that will drain funds away
from conservation and renewable resources. Supporters of the
proposed Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act often speak as if removing these new incentives
would ban thermal plants from the Northwest altogether.
Instead, of course, the result would simply be to leave in place
the existing balance of risks and benefits governing investment
decisions. The bill's sponsors have thus far succeeded in holding
urgently needed programs hostage to speculative ventures that
the region would be better off without. However, it may yet
prove possible to annul this misbegotten alliance, through constructive advocacy addressed to the Regional Council. That is a
challenge environmentalists must be prepared to accept.

45. The latest official forecast by the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee issued a blunt warning: if the Columbia River's waters drop to levels comparable
to those of the 1928-1932 drought years, and demand growth is not checked, the region
faces annual supply shortfalls that could exceed 3000 average megawatts-the requirements of three Seattles-in five of the next eleven years. PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, WEST GROUP FORECAST OF POWER LoADs AND RESOURCES: JUNE

1980

- JUNE

1991 2 (1980).

